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Peruvian Experience to Prevent and Solve Collective Labor Conflicts 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Admittedly, collective labor conflicts come from different economic activities, but it is 
fair to point out that in Perú they occur more often in both mining and quarrying 
activities than others. These kinds of social conflicts can be quite costly for our 
economy if the authorities do not intervene to resolve them on time, thus, these so-
called conflicts can make Peruvian union workers fall prey to this senseless 
complaining related trend to the extent where union rights can become a double edge 
sword in terms of convenience and/or benefit. This way, it is one of my interests to 
show how the Peruvian Ministry of Labor social affairs is dealing with these kind of 
social problems every day -to keep them on at controllable lowly even keel rate-, the 
public policies that have been implemented to strengthen its activities for preventing 
and resolving collective labor conflicts, their main causes, agreements to resolve them, 
among other related issues. Finally, I consider that the economic and social benefits that 
the Ministry of Labor reports in each intervention for Perú, must be measured in order 
to inform Peruvians and other institutions; that is what I intend to formalize in this 
paper.  
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Peruvian Experience to Prevent and Solve Collective Labor Conflicts 
 
I.- Introduction 
 
Peruvian collective labor disputes refer to confrontations between unionized workers 
(owners and suppliers of the labor force) and employers (labor demander) in the labor 
market institutions, whose treatments have not been yet regulated by a special law such 
as collective working relationships1; furthermore, these are caused by different factors, 
but possible to be solved in time, in prior to and preventing ways, in order to avoid high 
costs for the economy such as strikes and stoppages. Historically, the market labor has 
been a central institution in the economic analysis to allow us to explain the economic 
cycles and macroeconomic disequilibrium (Keynes, 1936), for instance, this institution 
has been taken into account by policymakers and some academic and researcher 
economists. Additionally, it has been currently considered as one of the twelve (12) 
main pillars to explain the competitiveness level of a country, according to Global 
Competitiveness Report (2009-2010).      
 
Consequently, we can notice easily that there are different imperfections in the labor 
market, and how Garavito (2006) said, according to North Douglas (1990), “we realize 
that institutional framework in the labor market is not only inefficient but also it is 
susceptible to be improved”2. Moreover, the labor conflicts “are different, and 
dependent of labor conditions that have been deteriorated, there are rights or interest 
disputes that take place between workers and employers. The resolution of labor 
conflicts occurs after negotiations between representations of unionized workers and 
representative of employers, and if there are not agreements, the official mediation 
institutions intervene. In difficult conflict events the employers can go on strike, and 
patrons can adopt the patron closing3.   
 
The labor conflict issues have been historically and widely know around the world, 
among them we have the occurred ones in the Great Depression episode (1920-1930), 
                                                 
1 It is far to point out that International Labor Organization and the Peruvian Political Constitution said 
that workers are entitled to unionize and strike liberty “as time goes by” and this fact is in turn making 
our knowledge and development sharper, however many Peruvian workers are faced with the need of 
being social conflicts managed which is something that the government might not have been used too. 
2 Garavito, Cecilia. Employment. Pontifice Catholic University of Perú. 
3 http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflictividad_laboral 
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when the enterprises were forced to reduce their production costs, and employees were 
laid off. Moreover, some countries have been institutionalizing collective labor conflicts 
through the collective bargaining laws, which have been accepted by workers as a 
successfully channel to reach their economic interests, consequently, workers and 
employers help and talk to each other to solve their interests and reduce social tension; 
the State plays a fundamental roll (Samukkethum, 2001)4.       
 
In Perú, the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion –through National Direction 
of Working Relationships-, Regional Directions of Working and Employment 
Promotion Offices of Regional Governments, and Judicial Institutions5, are the main 
actors to promote social dialogue as an instrument to prevent and solve labor conflicts. 
On the other hand, the strikes in Perú, as in many places around the world, are the result 
of unsolved labor conflicts, the disability of workers and employers to arrive 
agreements about worker demands, or scarcity tolerance of both to follow peacefully 
bargain. It is important to point out that most of Peruvians prefer to visit administrative 
institutions and regulator agencies to resolve their own demands, complaints, and some 
overall conflicts because the judicial institutions are unfriendly and have not enough 
credibility; as well as, they have highly accessing administrative costs, due to honorary 
lawyers, hoping time to give a sentence, among other compelling factors.            
 
When collective labor conflicts cannot be solved peacefully in time, the results are high 
costs for Peruvian economy, for example, in the case of stoppages and strikes, we have 
human capital losses represented them in millions of working hours6; which have been 
considered by many authors such as one of main production factors (Becker, 1990, 
Solow, 1956). There is not doubt that in some cases these collective labor conflicts 
exasperate street protests, including bandit actions with loss of human beings (La Oroya 
and Casapalca, 2009). For example, in the mining case we do not extract and produce 
minerals, for instance, there is not exportations, employment reductions and other kind 
                                                 
4 This is exactly what Ministry of Work and Labor Promotion is doing in order to reach the resolution of 
labor conflicts. 
5 The Defensoria del Pueblo, overally when knows about social conflicts, basically participates getting 
knowledge about them and sending them to the corresponding related institutions; according to the 
constitutional fundamental right mandates and the supervision of Peruvian government. Peruvian State 
Constitution of 1993.    
6 Ministry of Work and Labor Promotion. Statistics and Informatics Office. The Strikes in Perú. Statistics 
Bulletin. 
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of losses, non international money; this way all Peruvians workers, enterprises, central 
and regional governments are resulting damaged from labor conflicts.  
 
In different countries, the strike costs have been estimated broadly in terms of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), for example, 0,25% in United Kingdom, 1% in Canada,       
2,54% in India, among others; Perú has not made quantitative assessments to estimate 
the costs from these detrimentally costs of strike and stoppage related activities; 
furthermore, we have not found yet the production-strike sensitivity (eslasticities). 
However, we can inference from basic and preliminary studious of National Society of 
Mining, Oil and Energy (SNMPE) that Peruvian economy is losing by each twenty four 
(24) stoppage hours in mining industry about US$ 15 millions, according with last 24-
hours-stoppage in mining industry of 20077. Let me show the mainly direct and indirect 
costs: 
 
a) Main losses for workers. Dramatic losses in remuneration for workers, if they do not 
work, those stoppage workers should not receive payments, specially when stoppages 
and strikes are considered illegal, consequently, these workers and their family will not 
have money to finance their off the shelf daily activities and satisfy their basic 
necessities. These facts lead stoppage workers to keep under compelling psychological 
pressures; they can finish with detrimental emotional problems, which in turn with 
physical waste, reducing their productivities for working. Besides, this reduce the 
possibility that workers can be trained and educated by employers, similarly, 
impossibility future worker improvements to generate more income; among other costs 
regarding human capital losses (working hours).      
 
b) Main losses for enterprises. The collective labor conflicts are detrimental to 
enterprises in different ways because when workers stoppage, the labor input in these 
workplaces is negatively affected, for instance, conflicting enterprises reduce their daily 
production and selling income, at same time this affects productivity and efficiency at 
workplace, the present and future enterprise benefits; disabling new future investment, 
etc. Finally, we can consider that in case of international companies as mining 
enterprises, the discredit of their managers to resolve labor problems easy and keep up 
                                                 
7 This stoppage was auspice and promoted by Peruvian National Federation of Mining, Iron, Steel, and 
Metallurgy Industry.  
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with good unionized practices at workplace. Also, many Human Resource Managers 
can be seen such as bad administrators by enterprise owners.   
 
c) Main losses for Peruvian government. A detrimentally direct effect from labor 
conflict is the reduction of taxes collection, scarcity of funds to finance social programs 
of food, health, houses, education, and others, especially for poor people. Additionally, 
the exportations reduction caused by collective labor conflicts, causes reduction in 
foreign currency to finance international buying of technology, inputs and machineries 
difficult, to reach efficient production of Peruvian enterprises; consequently, reduction 
of productivity and competitiveness in our country. The collective labor conflicts cause 
detrimentally noise in the economy, the investment status that some international risk 
assessing agencies and well-know international investment banks are given for Peruvian 
economy in the last years can suffer detrimental reduction. Moreover, international 
investors, foreign citizens and governments, can have a bad vision about Perú such as 
productivity investment place, tourist destination, etc. This fact can in turn generate low 
investment, cero of new productive and/or formal employments; consequently, these 
can lead increasing of not dignity employment8.    
 
As we can see, due to the high costs and the detrimental consequences of unsolved labor 
conflicts in Peruvian economy, during the last years authorities, especially the federal 
government, have paid special attention to these conflicts. Now, let us take a look at the 
causes of these social conflicts that government must consider when implementing 
public policies in order to reduce them.  
 
a) Economic motivations. They appear when employers do not comply with paying 
workers economic and social benefits according to social standards and employment 
laws. Salary payment delays; lack of social security provision; security life and accident 
insurance; seniority bonus; vacation payments; extra working hours etc. We must take into 
consideration that some studies show that in France the number of strikes in one 
specific year will increase if workers succeeded at getting a salary raise in collective 
negotiations the year before (Den butter and Koppes, 2005).      
 
                                                 
8 This is against, main recommendations of International Organization Labor and Peruvian State 
Constitution.  
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b) Labor welfare. They appear when workplaces do not have family-friendly policies, or 
maybe industrial security regulations have not been implemented. In addition, workers, 
who are not treated with respect, develop their activities under psychological and 
physical pressures, or even worse, there is not a specific workplace for them to develop 
their activities. Actually, some employers harass unionized workers and labor union 
leaders; therefore, employers incur in anti-union practices, a fact which may even lead 
employers to fire unionized workers or their leaders. 
 
In this group we also have a little access to medicine, employers who are not provided 
with appropriate tools or uniforms to carry out their daily job activities and last but 
certainly not least, employers who constantly break laws of security. These facts will 
eventually lead to the increase in accidents at workplaces.       
 
c) Social and ideological motivations. These motivations refer to social, environmental, 
cultural and political factors that have indirect impact on workers’ decision to declare in 
a conflict of interest or go on strike other than for work-related-reasons only (economic 
or social). Among these reasons we have community influence or its representatives’ on 
workers’ behavior, some workers’ eagerness to establish their own unions in order to 
have influence on the entrepreneur, owners or managers’ decisions. Additionally, there 
is foreign as well as external influence such as the anti-globalization or environmental 
groups.   
 
According to an evaluation report for social conflict report (July, 2009) by the 
Ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), there were 272 social conflicts in Peru (including 
labor conflicts), of which 82% are active and the other 18% are in process. Likewise, 
this report shows that in July of the current year, there were only 31 labor conflicts, 11 
belong to the national scope, 5 to Lima and 3 to Piura. Such results differ from those of 
the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion9. This difference of numbers is 
because the Ombudsman cannot handle the real numbers of labor conflicts; on the 
contrary, these numbers are obtained from secondary sources such as the media 
(newspapers, magazines, television and radio programs etc.).     
 
                                                 
9 For the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion the amount of labor conflicts were more than 70 
in the same month. 
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II.- The Administrative Labor Authority 
 
The Ministry and The Regional Directions to Labor and Employment Promotion 
 
Besides the regular supply and demand agents in the labor market there is a third 
element, the State (as regulator) which, according to theoretical economic imperfections 
in this market (such as asymmetric information between the two parties10 and positive 
externalities of training programs for workers11, negative externalities of labor conflicts, 
etc.), is in charge of supervising and regulating in order to reduce losses and costs of 
market failures, towards the second-best solution12. Moreover, to deal with prevention 
and resolution of compelling labor conflicts, whose costs are socially higher than the 
private ones, referring exclusively to the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion 
(in the National Direction of Working Relationships), throughout the twenty five (25) 
Peruvian political regions. 
 
The National Direction of Working Relationships is a special office of the Ministry, 
which depends directly on the Vice Ministry of Labor,13 whose core competences are 
the coordination, proposition and evaluation of national policies for collective and 
individual work relationship issues by promoting social dialogue, conciliation and 
arbitration as means of solving labor conflicts and work relationships between 
employees and employers14. The National Direction Office is subdivided into four 
offices: (i) Legislation on Labor Studies, (ii) Training and Education, (iii) Technical 
Direction, Labor Welfare and Social Security and (iv) Regional Coordination Unit, all 
of which focus on labor conflicts prevention.  
 
                                                 
10 Spence, Michael. Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 87. Nº 3 (August, 
1973). Pp. 355-374. 
11 Becker, Gary. Human Capital. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to 
Education. National Bureau Economic Research. Third edition, 1993. Furthermore, the research of 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1998) consider that the increasing of productivity is nearly associated mainly 
with human capital investment. Lucas said that the investment in human capital of one person not only 
causes increasing in his/her own productivity but also in other workers. In other words, there are 
positive externalities from investment in human capital. Perlbach, Iris and Calderon, Mónica, 
“Education and Growth: Evolution of Mendoza Municipalities”.  
12 The ideal situation is that there are not problems (the first best). The State can intervene in order to 
reach minimum cost of social losses (second best).   
13 It is fair to point out that in the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion there are two Vice-
ministries, another one is the Vice-ministry of Employment Promotion.   
14 It is important to show that there are some forthcoming changes in the Ministry organization, when the 
new Organization and Function Regulation Law takes effect.  
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Likewise, the (i) Direction of Training and Education is diffusing different prevention 
labor conflict oriented laws and regulations as a mechanism to avoid potential labor 
conflicts, this Office is giving trained programs for workers, especially, for unionized 
leaders who are managing and directing union organizations, and employers 
(entrepreneurs), among others. Regarding, (iv) Regional Coordination Office, this is 
putting in charge the complying supervision of national proposals in labor conflict 
prevention related affairs, working occupational risk protection, welfare and securities 
protection for workers, among others. Furthermore, one of the main functions of the (iii) 
Technician Direction of Labor Welfare and Social Security is exactly to promote the 
dialogue, conciliation, mediation, and arbitrage such as resolution tools of labor 
confrontations, appeared in working relationships between workers and employers. 
 
This way,15 in order to develop exclusively prevention and resolution oriented activities 
to avoid labor conflicts the Ministry has implemented this year (2009) a new exclusive 
Prevention and Resolution Labor Conflict Office, with the goal to intervene prior and/or 
on time; and the previously year, 2008, had implemented the new Early Alert 
Information System to receive information and manage labor conflicts in the national 
scope on time. When the Ministry realizes about these facts (collective labor conflicts), 
the conciliators of this Office operate quickly developing informative meetings with 
workers or employers, separately, call off dialogue meetings with employees and 
employers all together, furthermore, they coordinate official diligence with Working 
National Inspection of this Ministry to visit workplace enterprises in conflict, among 
other related activities.  
 
According to the Peruvian political division, in the Regional government scope, we 
have Regional Directions of Labor and Employment Promotion, which are non 
concentrated (or independent) offices of the Ministry of Labor, they depend technically 
and normatively of the Ministry. As well as both institutions have exclusive and shared 
functions. A further point is that Regional Directions have the commission of 
performing political actions issued by central institutions according to state Peruvian 
                                                 
15 The Early Alert System results are currently assessing by one Engineer and one Economist –helping 
them by two assistants-, indeed, the National Direction Office has started issuing recently a monthly 
institutional document “Statistics about Prevention and Resolution Labor Conflict Related Activities”. 
These activities must be part of the especial department for assessing labor conflicts, to obtain 
conclusions and recommendations for better monitoring and adaptation of related public policies to 
effectively prevent labor conflicts.  
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policies, sector and regional plans about work and employment promotion; moreover, to 
guide, supervise and evaluate other correspondently labor and working sector actions.        
 
In addition, within these twenty five (25) Regional Direction Offices of Labor and 
Employment Promotion there are two especial offices: (a) Labor Conflict Prevention 
Office, and (b) Employment Promotion, Profession Formation and Micro and Small 
Business Office. At the same time, the first regional office (a) is composed by four sub 
offices: (i) Collective Bargain, (ii) Labor Inspection, Security and Health in the Job, (iii) 
General Registration, and finally, (iv) Gratuitous Legal Defense. Admittedly, since the 
Organization and Function Regulation Law of the Ministry of Labor we can only 
inference that in the Peruvian political regions the Labor Conflict Prevention Offices 
must deal with prevention and resolutions related activities to collective labor conflicts; 
but it is better that this especial function can be expressed by writing in the organization 
law. 
 
There is no doubt that, the best way to resolve the labor conflict is through the direct 
social dialogue; talking, bargaining and/or discussing between workers and employers 
with the aim to reach a peacefully agreement bout labor legislation controversies, 
worker demands and complaints16. If both (workers and employer) can not resolve 
directly their own controversies, there are Conflict Resolution Related Alternative 
Mechanisms (MARCs) to return again to dialogue through extra process meetings17, in 
order to resolve their collective labor conflicts, these fact can be made in all Regional 
Direction of Labor Conflict Prevention and Resolution. Moreover, it is possible to visit 
(in secondly instance) to National Direction of Working Relationships of the Ministry to 
ask for a meting between the shares of conflicts, being the mediator and/or conciliator 
(especial lawyers). Most of the time when the labor social dialogue breaks out, the 
conflicts turned into stoppages and strikes, bringing huge costs for Peruvian economy.  
 
                                                 
16 Taking account the Theory of Game, those are “Cooperative Games” which need explicit agreements 
or contract in order to comply these agreements. 
17 Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion. “Friendly Working Relationships”, about Conflict 
Resolution Alternative Mechanisms in Labor oriented Affairs. Pp. 20. Printed by Graphic Creative. 
Lima - Perú, 2008. 
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It is important to point out that, different European countries such as The Netherlands, 
France, etc., have developed the Rhineland Model18 where public policy and economic 
political proposals are developed in scientific way, allowing the social dialogue (Den 
Butter, 2006), in Perú most of the times the implementation of these policies, and 
specially the labor policies, not having those direction, in spite of the fact that in the last 
years the labor economists have increased in Perú (Yamada, 2004). Overall, there is not 
a Peruvian institution that makes these statistic, mathematic, and economic studious (ex-
ante) to measure the impact of these kinds of policies adaptation previously, through 
econometric specifications and models similar other developed countries19. Marginally, 
in the last years to pass some law projects the Congress of Peruvian Republic requires 
an benefit–cost assessment, which is most of the time superficially doing by advisers, 
because Peruvian Public Sector do not have specialized professionals; most of them are 
lawyers without mathematics and statistics training. 
 
Enhancing the prevention and resolution labor conflict functions of the Ministry: 
The Early Alert Project 
 
With the aim to enhance the prevention and resolution labor conflict related activities in 
Perú, the Ministry of Labor and Employment Promotion signed an international 
cooperation agreement with International Spain Cooperation Agency to Development 
(AECID) of the Spain Kingdom Government, to implement the “Early Alert System” in 
four years (2007-2010), which cost was S/. 2.976.087.20 According to the International 
Cooperation Agreement, the cost of the project should have financed by both, Peruvian 
government and AECID, with 60% and 40% of the cost, respectively. For instance, at 
the final period the Spain Cooperation Institution will have spend (as a donation for 
Perú) S/. 1.170.018 Nuevo Soles (equivalently to 300.000 Euros) and the Ministry will 
have invested S/. 1.806.069 Nuevos Soles, (equivalently to 463.094 Euros). However, 
                                                 
18 The Rhineland Model is that it poses a balance between free market-forces and social an environmental 
responsibility. Social justice cannot be attained through market forces only, but must be guaranteed by 
society. Cooperation rather than competition is the keyword. Economic security before economic 
flexibility.  
19 For instance, we must know the elasticity (percentage production variations in the presence of labor 
conflict variations) in the mining or industrial sectors; consequently, we can currently realize how Perú 
is losing quantitatively for each labor conflict, in these economic production sectors.   
20 This international cooperation agreement has its origin in the Final Minutes of the IX Mix Commission 
of Hispano-Peruvian Cooperation, happened in Lima, on November, 23, 2006.  
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the execution of the project started in January of 2008, and it is expected to finish by the 
end of 2011. 
 
Thus, the Early Alert Project look for enhancing especially the National Direction of 
Working Relationships as an institution to coordinate, propone and assess the national 
policies about collective and individual relationships at workplaces by promoting the 
social dialogue and the Conflict Resolution Related Alternative Mechanisms (MARCs). 
Consequently, the Project has three mainly components: (i) improving those Conflict 
Resolution Related Alternative Mechanisms, (ii) training people (workers, employers, 
union leaders, public employees) in order to resolve the labor conflicts; and (iii) early 
management of conflicts. Therefore, to reach these results, the activities of the project 
are concentrate in: (a) campaigns to promote and diffuse of labor laws and Social 
Responsibility of Employers and Employees, (b) improving the social dialogue in the 
Ministry with participation of employers and employees, (c) buying and replace 
information equipments, (d) conditioning the areas of the National Direction Office to 
have capacity to attend the conflict labor actors; and (e) develop and implementation of 
a especial software about “Early Alert”. 
 
The Early Alert System includes the general dates of enterprises, workers (and unions) 
in conflict, the law conditions of them, official names, legal representing, the official 
number as contributor (RUC), telephone number, address or geographical localization, 
includes the political Region, among others. As well as facts of the problems (or 
collective labor conflicts) such as dates, main occurrences, main causes of conflicts, 
prior diligences and actions adopted by Regional and National Labor Authorities on 
these conflicts. 
 
Nowadays, the actors that feed/use the System are public workers of the Regional 
Directions of Labor and Employment Promotion and National Direction of Working 
Relationships, who keep up with the current information about labor conflicts in their 
own region. It is possible that after its complete implementation around Perú, it can be 
worthy for other Public Institutions, Ministries, the Ombudsman (Defensoría del 
Pueblo), private institutions, unions, non governmental organizations (ONGs), 
enterprises associations, etc. Since the implementation of the System, March of 2008, 
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(over one and half year), the main causes of conflict labor are collective bargaining of 
complaint statement sheet.   
    
Taking into account the training actions and the labor law diffusion of the Project, the 
unionized workers (and non unionized workers), as well as the employers (and 
employer society) are expected to get witty knowledge about labor law issues such as 
labor collective rights, labor individual rights, collective bargaining, union rights, direct 
and indirect hiring worker laws, intermediation hiring worker laws, etc., of course, the 
best witty knowledge about these laws will permit rewarding bargaining of labor 
contracts and/or the asking workers.  
 
On the other hand, the development of the Early Alert System the Ministry of Labor and 
Promotion Employment is, without a doubt, likely to foster thorough solutions in case 
of odd relationships in the labor market between employees and employers so as to 
avoid detrimental consequences for Peruvian economy. This System is meant to provide 
and promote quick solutions in labor market situation of people, in other words, it is 
able to help labor authority enforce resolutions mechanisms in order to solve collective 
labor conflicts. Before the adaptation of the System, some labor conflicts triggered 
stoppages and strikes, some of which resulted in street protests and confrontations 
between workers and police officers.   
 
Finally, it is fair to point out that the other institutions benefited with the international 
project is the National Council for Work and Employment Promotion which is a 
consultation institution of the Ministry of Labor. The National Council is the highest 
natural scenario for social dialogue between workers, employers and the State 
(including the Minister and the Regional authorities). Basically, the Counsel is supposed 
to support better training and education programs as well as the prevention of labor 
conflicts and the mechanisms to solve them.   
 
III.- The Collective Labor Conflicts and the Ministry of Labor and Employment 
Promotion 
 
In order to know how about the Peruvian experience to resolve collective labor conflicts 
has been those years, I have reviewed carefully all the files stored about different cases 
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of these kind of labor conflicts dealing by the Ministry of Labor, since January of 2006 
through this year (September, 2009). Those archives are exactly in the National 
Direction of Working Relationships, and contained citations to informative meetings, 
dialogue meetings, and extra-process meetings, assistance writing minutes, agreement 
writing minutes in the case of conflict resolution, some historical financial analysis of 
entrepreneurs in conflict, among other documents.   
 
Collective labor conflict classification 
 
First off, we have to point out that the confrontations between workers and employers 
called by the Ministry of Labor as Collective labor conflicts in the assessing period 
(2006-2009) have reached more than half thousand, and they are from different 
economy activities. Some of those labor conflicts have been dealing correctly by the 
Ministry, reaching rewarding solutions, whereas other cases are even in the dialogue 
stage, this means that they have been bargaining between actors yet, with the thoroughly 
participation of Ministry of Labor as both, social dialogue facilitator and promoter, at 
the same time.  
Table Nº 1: Collective labor conflicts by economic sector 
Economic sectors 2006 2007 2008 2009-Sep Tot. %  
Mining and Quarrying   28 48 64 115 255 45.1 
Manufacturing industry 12 12 30 72 126 22.3 
Real estate, renting and Business activities 0 8 20 0 28 4.9 
Cooperative society of services 4 0 0 7 11 1.9 
Electricity, gas and water supply 7 0 5 13 25 4.4 
Transportations, Storage and Communications 3 0 5 2 10 1.8 
Financial intermediation 3 2 2 2 9 1.6 
Construction (building) 1 1 3 5 10 1.8 
Fishing 0 1 3 3 7 1.2 
Education 3 1 2 3 9 1.6 
Health and social work 0 1 1 3 5 0.9 
Public Administration and Security 0 0 4 2 6 1.1 
Retail and Wholesale Commerce  0 0 2 0 2 0.4 
Activity others 10 6 6 41 63 11.1 
TOTAL 71 80 147 268 566 100% 
Number of afected workers 52754 50359 126827    
Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 
Also, there is no denying that the participations of the collective labor conflicts in each 
economy sector is asymmetric, but having more and compelling percentage 
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representation the confrontations in the Mining and quarrying productive sector 
(45,1%); followed by Industry and Manufacturing (22,3%), Real estate, renting and 
business activities (4,9%), Electricity, gas and water supply (4,4%), Cooperative society 
of services (1,9%), Transportations, storage and communications services (1,8%), 
construction (building) sector (1,8%), Financial intermediation (1,6%), education 
(1,6%), fishing (1,2%), among others (11,1%). See at table Nº 1. 
 
Likewise, we can see that each year the labor conflicts treated by the Ministry of Labor 
have dramatically increased, especially, in the Mining and Quarrying sector, more than 
40%, and quicker than other sectors, the participation has been 39,4%, 60%, 43,5% and 
43%, in these four years (2006-2009), respectively. On the other hand, we have to 
acknowledge that the participation of these collective conflicts in each productivity 
sector has been varied significantly in those years, too. Another sector labor conflict that 
has been increasing dramatically is manufacturing industry, indeed in the present year, 
2009. Whereas, the other kind of sector labor conflicts are rarely and less significantly; 
and their increasing percentage rate have been basically small; we can see the behaviors 
of the most compelling labor conflicts in the graphic number one. 
 
Graph Nº 1: Collective labor conflicts by economic sector 
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      Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 
There is not doubt that the causes that have been borne out these collective labor 
conflicts in these four years of assessing are different, they are not like other social, 
political, environment conflicts that used to be in Perú. These causes are more than 600, 
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it means more than the number of labor conflicts, however the compelling one cause is 
economic type which in turn, best typifies one of the major problems of Peruvian 
workers. Consequently, there are grounds to believe that workers are receiving low 
salaries, especially workmen who are making non specialized activities along with less 
productivity and qualification jobs.  
 
This way, firstly, the main cause is definitely unresolved collective bargaining21 and/or 
submit complaint statement sheet to the employers directly which includes asking or 
requirements of raising salaries (33,5%), both are unable to resolve their confrontations 
according to Collective Working Relationships Law; secondly, unjustified firing 
workers out or not renew hiring contracts of them (after finishing their prior period of 
contract) (17,4%), in this case workers are getting their own pink slip without clearly 
reasons. 
 
Thirdly, non respectful or non union rights considerations by the employers (12,5%), 
fourth, non fulfillment or un respectful previous agreements (10%), non compliment of 
mining services obligations and compromises with workmen (1,7%), asking for 
increasing salary (3%), among other (21,7%). Of course, it is important to point out that 
in some cases, one collective labor conflict was motivated by more than one cause; 
finally, as a result in those tables we have more number of causes than number of labor 
conflicts in the period of assessing.    
 
Table Nº 2: Main causes of collective labor conflicts  
 
Main causes 2006 2007 2008 2009-I Total % 
Complaint Statement Sheet/Collective bargaining 25 36 85 69 215 33,5 
Unrespectful of union rights (union license 
requirement) 
19 7 32 22 80 12,5 
Non fulfillment of previous agreements 15 9 20 14 64 10,0 
Unjustified firing workers out 9 11 35 57 112 17,4 
Non fulfillment of Mining services obligation 6 3 2 0 11 1,7 
Asking for increasing salaries 2 7 7 3 19 3,0 
Re- located in prior working position 1 1 0 0 2 0,3 
Other causes  7 17 22 93 139 21,7 
TOTAL 84 91 203 167 642  
Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 
Additionally, there are other types of motivations, for example, the natural and 
ideological rejection that some workers can have for private –national or foreign- 
                                                 
21 According to Peruvian Working Collective Relationships Law. 
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investment (especially, workmen with less cultural level) in the Mining and Quarrying 
sector, in spite of the fact that 37 national and international mining companies signed a 
special voluntary contribution agreement with the Peruvian State by starting the current 
government. These mining companies compromised to contribute with more than a half 
million of New Soles per year; consequently, by the end of this period of government 
they will have to contribute with more than 2.500 millions of New Soles.  
 
However, we can see that according to policy decision of central government, the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance has not transferred the total of the contributions yet, 
but also only a portion. This can be other motivation that from political scope crosses to 
labor scope, because the historically wrong redistribution of mining contributions have 
been caused in Perú sometimes, confrontations between regional governments, and/or 
among them with central government.  
 
On the other hand, it could be that “cultural difference” with respect to the original 
Quechua population with a Hispanic background in the Mining and Quarrying sector is 
minimum because in this exporting-oriented-sector, workers and unions are worrying 
over keeping up with national and international information about mining prices 
evolution, main international buyers, international evolution, international financial 
crisis, among others; most of Peruvian mining workers are maintained a clearly 
Hispanic background. 
 
Graph Nº 2: Main causes of labor conflicts  
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Last but not least, as we can see overally, one of the main causes of collective labor 
conflicts as time goes by has been based on the scarcity of suitable and previous 
industrial organization preparations for labor policy and working relationship 
implementations in Perú; there are a lot of empirical evidences that labor laws are much 
rigid22, there are not scientific elaboration of proposal laws in Peruvian Congress, 
indeed in other public institutions.  
 
Besides, exactly the organisation of economic policy preparation –including its process 
of formation- in mining sector is one of the most important factors to explain the major 
amount of labour conflicts, it is not like in other sectors, the institutions setting up are 
different, for example, there are especial rules to hire workers, for typical and for a non 
typical working day, especial enterprises to intermediate the hiring of workers for the 
mining companies, etc. Most of the times these intermediate hiring companies are 
viewed such abusive and un-respectful, because of the fact that they are hiring workers 
without providing them with all the social benefits according to Peruvian social labour 
regulation, fundamental working rights, etc.   
 
Table Nº 3: Union workers in conflicts by economic sector 
Economic sectors 2006 2007 2008 Total % 
Mining and Quarrying   117 0 0 117 0.05 
Manufacturing industry 0 0 1214 1214 0.53 
Real estate, renting and Business activities 22044 26361 36186 84591 36.79 
Cooperative society of services 7552 8275 23178 39005 16.96 
Electricity, gas and water supply 3718 0 3904 7622 3.31 
Transportations, Storage and Communications 0 0 2790 2790 1.21 
Financial intermediation 775 0 5022 5797 2.52 
Construction (building) 5492 0 2742 8234 3.58 
Fishing 2560 10242 27702 40504 17.62 
Education 0 1630 14071 15701 6.83 
Health and social work 7133 926 4414 12473 5.42 
Public Administration and Security 3363 2539 2851 8753 3.81 
Retail and Wholesale Commerce  0 386 255 641 0.28 
Activity others 0 0 2498 2498 1.09 
TOTAL 52754 50359 126827 229940 100 
Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 
 
                                                 
22 Instituto Peruano de Economía. Diary comment “Labor Reform”. Lima. February, 19th. 2009.   
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The dealing of the Ministry with collective labor conflicts   
 
First and foremost, it is fair to point out that Peruvian Administration Labor according 
to Labor Collective Relationship Law23 has implemented four different legal tools such 
as Labor Conciliation, Labor Negotiation, Labor Mediation, and Labor Arbitration to 
provide workers and employers with resolving friendly labor conflicts mechanisms, and 
this fact is in turn making worker`s knowledge and development sharper, however many 
workers beings are faced with the need of being these Mechanisms friendly, which is 
something that they might not have been used to. Indeed, these four administrative 
processes have not allowed them to resolve all theirs completely daily own conflicts in 
the labor market. 
 
The currently efforts and functions of Peruvian Administrator Labor is seeking to keep 
these conflicts on a slowly even keel rate, for instance, the Peruvian Administration 
Labor has been implemented “Labor Conflict Resolution Related Alternative 
Mechanisms” such as “informative meetings”, “extra-process meetings”, and “dialogue 
meetings”, indeed, some results of using them might become more beneficial for 
Peruvian mining workers than other economic sector workers. Peruvian workers must 
anticipate the importance of “Labor Conflict Solution Related Alternative Mechanisms” 
to resolve their social and economic problems; consequently, “Alternative Mechanisms” 
which would definitely help employees and employers to participate in social dialogue 
policies, do not become a misunderstanding prone issue, maybe unlike some 
mechanisms in the Labor Collective Relationship Law. 
 
The National Direction of Working Relationships after taking account of the existence 
(or possibility) of these conflicts by Early Alert System, the direct communication of 
Regional Directions, workers and/or unions in disputes, or maybe by presenting 
“striking resolutions of unions”; in prior way the Ministry of Labor to summon workers 
and employers in conflict to know better about the conflict facts through “informative 
meetings” and/or “dialogue meetings”. Additionally, if it is possible, the Ministry 
makes official diligences to make official inspectional visits to the workplaces in 
                                                 
23 Passed in 2003. 
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disputes or controversies, in coordination with National Direction of Inspection of this 
Ministry.      
 
Table Nº 4: Informative meetings, dialogue meetings and extra-process meetings 
 
Economic sectors 2006 2007 2008 2009.Set TOTAL %  
Fishing 0 0 15 5 20 1.0 
Mining and Quarrying   48 123 276 526 973 49.4 
Manufacturing industry 15 45 116 317 493 25.1 
Electricity, gas and water supply 9 4 18 29 60 3.0 
Construction and building 0 0 11 11 22 1.1 
Retail and Wholesale Commerce 0 0 7 0 7 0.4 
Cooperative society of services 7 0 0 11 18 0.9 
Transports, Storage and Communications 5 2 11 12 30 1.5 
Financial intermediation 3 5 3 7 18 0.9 
Administración pública y defensa 0 0 12 0 12 0.6 
Education 3 3 5 5 16 0.8 
Real estate, renting and business activities 0 21 39 0 60 3.0 
Social and Health Services 0 0 1 10 11 0.6 
Other activities 14 8 22 184 228 11.6 
TOTAL 104 211 536 1117 1968 100% 
Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 
After that, the Ministry to summon workers and employers in conflict especial meetings 
called “extra-process”, they have been more than 95% in our period of assessing, then 
as we can see in table Nº 3, the participation of mining and quarrying sector is more 
than 50%, followed by manufacturing industry with 26%; the different meetings are 
concentrated in both economy sector (74,5%). The extra-process meeting rate control is 
intended to foster reasonable monitoring of labor conflicts in these two economy 
sectors; that is why a proper follow through must apply.  
 
Meeting`s participation in other economic sectors have been according to those labor 
conflicts, for example, real estate, renting and business activities with 3,0%, electricity, 
gas and water supply 3%, transports, storage and communications sector has 
participated with 1,5%, fishing 1%, financial intermediation 0,9%, cooperative society 
of services 0,9%, other activities. These results consider the stock of collective labor 
conflicts in the four years, but if we see the flux of year per year, we can notice that the 
participation of each sector is different but the two higher are mining and quarrying and 
manufacturing industry sectors. 
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The number of these kinds of different meetings does not have any limits in the 
different productivity sectors in order to resolve each labor conflict, in some cases this 
number is more than twenty (22); given that workers and employer representations must 
think over about their proposals, it would require to consult with other members, union 
bases or enterprise owners, whereas in other cases it can mean that there has been 
nonflexible positions of both negotiator parts, basically, in the case of anachronism 
unions –influenced by political positions- or non respectful employers24.      
 
Solved collective labor conflicts and main agreements  
 
There is no denying that detrimentally off the shelf situations in the labor market are 
resolved if the Labor Authority provides employees and employers with especially 
designed prior Labor Conflict Resolution Related Alternative Mechanisms such as 
“informative meetings”, “extra-process meetings”, and “dialogue meetings”25; for 
instance, in these assessed years (2006-2009) the Ministry of Labor have carefully  
resolved 234 labor conflicts, which in turn have allowed us to avoid potential quite 
economy costs from stoppages (or strikes) and odd social reactions on streets every day 
in different regions of Perú, or maybe extremely hazardous and noisy protests in front of 
the Ministry of Labor in Lima.  
 
This way, in accordance with the fact that labor disputes play “as time goes by” a more 
prominent role in industrial relationships in Perú, Peruvian workers must anticipate the 
economic cost that strikes can report for our country, for instance, the labor conflict 
growth rate control is intended to foster reasonable monitoring of the labor conflicts, 
that is why a proper follow through must apply.    
 
On the other hand, we must to acknowledge that these so-called social labor conflicts 
can and are making Peruvian union workers fall prey to this senseless complaint and 
conflictive related trend to the extent where unionized worker rights and Labor Conflict 
Resolution Related Alternative Mechanisms have become a double edged sword in 
terms of convenience and/or benefit. Peruvian workers are stressing over keeping up 
                                                 
24 Indeed, some of these enterprises could not practice Social Responsibility Labor Policies (RSE); and/or 
they do not have vanguard family friendly policies.  
25 It seems that the Peruvian way of organizing shows some similarity to The Netherlands model (Butter, 
Frank, 2009). 
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with their bargaining capacity and their sense of justice by these collective labor 
conflicts. 
 
Graph Nº 3: Quarterly flux of solved collective labor conflicts (2006-2009) 
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Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 
This way, the workers who were participate in the labor conflicts after signing 
agreement minutes with employer representations with intervention of the Ministry of 
Labor were benefited with at least one economic and social related benefit such as 
raising salary, hiring workers again after being fired out by bad employers, especial 
economic benefits or bonus for their child in schooling age, food nutrition allowance, 
working uniforms for doing daily activities at workplaces, working under earth and/or 
working in the hills monetary assignments in the case of mining industry, monetary 
assignment vacations, completion of Complaint Statement Sheets, bonuses for death of 
workers and/or nearest relatives, among others. The amount of resolved labor conflicts 
has been increased “as time goes by”; see at table Nº 4.  
 
Consequently, the total of benefited workers from resolved collective labor conflicts, 
near of 25% were benefited with generally salary increasing, hence in spite of labor 
conflicts being one of social problems, workers are thoughtfully benefited from them. 
Indeed, different Peruvian labor economists and international institutions, especially the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), were fostered that salary in Peruvian labor 
market is lower and cheaper than other in Latin America countries. Furthermore, they 
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said that the Legal Minimum Wage allows finance only the 40% of Basic Familiar 
Budget. 
 
Table Nº 5: Solved collective labor conflicts by economic sector 
 
Economic Sectors 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total Par % 
Mining and Quarrying   8 45 78 71 202 64,5 
Cooperative society of services 3 0 0 0 3 1,0 
Electricity, gas and water supply 1 0 0 0 1 0,3 
Manufacturing industry 0 3 15 20 38 12,1 
Construction (building) 0 0 5 4 9 2,9 
Commerce 0 1 1 0 1 0,3 
Transports, Storage and Communications 0 0 0 2 2 0,6 
Financial intermediation 0 0 0 2 2 0,6 
Real estate, renting and business activities 0 6 21 13 40 12,8 
Fishing 0 1 0 0 1 0,3 
Education  0 1 2 0 3 1,0 
Activity others 1 1 1 8 11 3,5 
TOTAL 13 57 123 120 313 100 
Benefited workers (thousands) 20,76 50,10 137,11 51,77 260  
Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 
According to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) the large 
number of resolved labor conflicts are precisely from Mining and Quarrying Sector, 
more than 60%, the most conflicting economic sector, following by the Real state, 
renting and business activities (13%), Manufacturing industry (12%), Construction 
(3%), Education (1,0%), among others. Other characteristic showed is the rapidly 
increasing of resolved labor conflicts in the period of study (2006-2009), the increasing 
rate in this period is extremely significant. See graph number 2.  
  
The main agreements between employers and employees through signing agreement 
minutes in the extra-process meetings in the Ministry of Labor and finish their 
confrontations were more than 580, which in turn maintain a thoughtfully relationship 
with economic issues, labor conditions at workplaces, social welfare in their 
community, indeed with politic affairs; however, the economic (monetary) entrepreneur 
compromises with their workers were the most notorious agreements. The participating 
of salary increasing agreement (N.S/. 10 New Soles monthly) was 17,2%.      
 
 
 
 
Table Nº 6: Main agreements in the solved collective labor conflicts 
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Main agreements: 2006 2007 2008 Set.2009 Tot. %  
General salary increasing of salary 5 21 47 27 100 17,2 
Extra allowance /closing negotiation 1 11 25 18 55 9,4 
Food allowances 1 17 6 5 29 5,0 
Child schooling allowances  0 15 22 12 49 8,4 
Special allowance to perfect assistance 1 0 15 0 16 2,7 
Allowance per dead of workers and/or 
their family 2 4 9 29 44 7,5 
Re – hiring of workers (re - incorporate)  1 6 1 4 12 2,1 
Re - located in prior working position 3 2 1 1 7 1,2 
Other agreements (union licenses, other 
special allowances, working dress, 
equipments and tools, etc.) 
14 71 104 82 271 46,5 
Total 28 147 230 178 583 100% 
Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 
IV.- Theoretic model considered by Labor Administrative Authority to deal with 
collective labor conflicts 
 
The mathematic function that is finding to optimization the Labor Administrative 
Authority in a period is the following V(0), number 4.1, in this we must to consider an 
additional variable to represent the number of labor conflicts (µ) dealt with, by the 
Ministry of Labor, it has a negative effect in the Peruvian social and economy, which in 
turn µ must be the least possible. It is important to point out that it is impossible to think 
that this variable (the collective labor conflicts) could be cero, because of the fact that 
labor conflicts are inherent to employers and employees relationships in the Labor 
market; indeed, according to the different theoretic imperfections in the market, 
admitted by economic theory. 
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Thus, we must take account that the production social function considered for the 
country is: 


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µ,),(,)()( ttLtKFtY                           (4.2) 
   K: capital stock;  k(t): stock of capital percapita 
c(t): Consumption  
L: Laboral   
t: Time 
µ: Collective labor conflicts 
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As we can see, the social production function directly depends on the productive factors 
capital and labor, and the time, in normal situations or not financial international crisis, 
whereas the labor conflicts represented by µ, it has a negative effect in Peruvian 
economy, because of labor conflicts affect negatively the current enterprise production 
function, the workers are distracted in the production process in order to bargain their 
complaint sheets and find solutions for their labor problems.    
 
On the other hand, the benefit function that the enterprises i finds to maximization is 
directly related with production level “f” and adversely related with the production costs 
and the costs of collective labor conflicts µ in the period of assessing, it could be 
represented by: 
)().(),),(),(()( µδµπ cwlkrttltkfti −−+−=                          (4.3) 
In equation 4.3, both r and δ represent the traditional costs of capital and depreciation of 
physical capital, respectively, and w.l is the cost of labor force, furthermore, the 
enterprises to confront labor conflict costs, and finds to reduce bolstered by the Ministry 
of Labor, this is represented by c(µ). The technology or production function y(t) has 
such as restrictions the capital and labor force; besides, the function depends on the time 
t and negatively of the number of labor conflicts µ happened in a determined period of 
time. 
),),(),(()(
−+++
= µttltkftyi                                            (4.4) 
Regarded with the families, we have that they are the owner of the labor force l, they 
supply their labor services to the enterprises in order to receive a dignity salary to 
consume goods and/or services in order to satisfy their own necessities and maximize 
their utility function as time goes by. The utility function is represented by: 
 
[ ] dteeetcuU tntt ....)(
0
ρφ −−∞∫=       (4.5) 
 
This function allows us to understand that it is about a representative family that is 
related directly to consume, and considers the utility of its future generations, whereas it 
is affected negatively by the labor conflicts at workplaces, represented by the increasing 
rate “¢”. The discounted rate ρ shows that as the time goes by, or is larger, the 
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importance of future generations in the current period by the representative family is 
going down. However, and equal to Ramsey (1.928), we can assumption that the ρ = 0, 
for example, in the case it is a welfare function of social planer. Thus we can rewrite the 
utility function (4.5) as: 
 
 [ ] dteetcuU ntt ...)(
0
φ−∞∫=          (4.6) 
 
This way, we can say that the consume of the family in a moment c(t) is directly related 
with the salary (yl(t)) and the not labor income y(t), such as the those revenues which 
come from the small workers business, their rents from hiring some properties, interest 
earnings, etc., (yln(t)), furthermore, the c(t) is affected negatively by the labor conflicts 
(µ) that appeared in the relationships with their own employers, when they have not 
attended their complaints. 
),)(,)(()(
−++
= µtytyctc Nlli      (4.7) 
Supposedly that the representative family does not save money because of the fact that 
the salaries are very cheap in Perú, and especially of union workmen in collective labor 
conflict, the real budget restriction must be:  
)),().()( µγ twyltwtc Nli −+=     (4.8) 
In equation 4.8, the symbol γ represents the fraction of the income that the workers loss 
by collective labor conflicts in Perú, which in turn affects negatively the consumption of 
workers. The resolution of the model allows us to find the optimum level of labor 
conflicts µ* that the Labor Administrative Authority must maintain (slowly, in the 
steady state, stable and predectible), consequently, to get the optimum of social welfare 
function or reduce at minimum the social costs from these collective labor conflicts, in 
the different productive sectors; but especially in the mining activity.  
),,,(*
/ −−+++
= ρφµµ tn       (4.9) 
The quantity of collective labor conflicts µ is directly related with the increasing of 
them φ, the rate of increasing workers n, but we can not know prior the time t, because 
of the fact that these labor conflicts change according to the period of time we are 
assessing. Finally, µ is negatively (against) related with the discounted time rate (ρ), if 
the workers discounted much the future, or they are less worried about their future 
generations, they are not interested in improve their current (or future) salaries; 
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consequently, they not present salaries complaint sheet, or other type, thus reduced the 
quantity of collective labor conflicts: µ.  
 
V.- Main socioeconomic benefits from solved collective labor conflicts with the 
intervention of the Ministry of Labor 
 
First and foremost, it is fair to point out that it is necessary to estimate the benefit for 
Peruvian Economy of the collective labor conflict resolutions, in order to know the 
main results of positive Labor Authority interventions; furthermore, to inform our 
country about the results of the government function, assessing costs vs. benefits. For 
instance, I have proposed at Ministry of Labor the following simple methodology.   
 
Practice method used by the Ministry of Labor to estimate the main benefits 
 
This method intends to measure the benefits of prevention strikes and stoppages in 
different economic sectors, especially mining sector, according to the follow steps: 
 
First, we must to see and count how many resolved collective labor conflicts per each 
economic productive sectors after signing workers and employers an “agreement 
minute”; it is important to point out that the number of these resolved labor conflicts are 
more than the number of “agreement minutes”. For example, in a big mining company 
there are different thirdly sub contract enterprises so-called in Perú such as services; 
most of the time by signing one of these “minute” the Ministry of Labor achieve to 
resolve more than one collective conflict in the labor market.  
 
Second, we must take account the value of labor hour (Vh) in each economic sector, for 
example in the mining sector (Vhm), we can use the mining exportations as Proxy value 
of mining sector, divided by the number of total working hours in the period of 
assessing (2006-2009). In this case I hope that the value of one hour will be equal to the 
estimated value by the National Society of Mining, Oil and Energy (SNMPE); 
especially, when they estimate the costs of mining stoppages for Peruvian economy.  
 
totalhm
GDPMining
Vhm
.
=     (5.1) 
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Third, regarding the number of days I have considered as potential stoppages avoided 
after solving collective labor conflict, they must provide from duration historic dates of 
previous stoppages issued by the Statistics Office of the Ministry of Labor; or maybe 
we can take the average previously strike days, or forty eight (48) hours, the duration of 
the last stoppage in the mining sector. This is consistent with the previous observed 
information. Besides, we can use all the relevant information in order to avoid the well 
know “Lucas critique”.   
 
Fourth, the total of avoided losing hours must be estimated per each enterprise which 
resolved their conflicts, it is obtained multiplied the number of workers by days 
obtained in stage third,  
 
Fifth, the number of hour estimated in the stage fourth must be multiplied by the value 
of one hour in their own economic sector (Vhm), after that we have to obtain the value 
of benefits per each enterprise that has resolved their confrontations with their own 
workers by participating in extra process meetings in the Ministry of Labor.  
ii tVhmEvit *=          (5.2) 
Finally, sixth, when we obtain the addition of the last estimations -per each resolved 
collective labor conflict case (Eviti)-, we are obtaining the monetary value benefit from 
directly intervention of the Ministry of Labor in prevention and resolution labor conflict 
policy.   
∑
=
=
n
i
iEvitBenefits
1
                     (5.3) 
 
Estimation of the economic benefits to Perú by preventing and solved collective 
labor conflicts 
 
The social and economic benefits for Perú of intervention of Ministry of Labor to 
resolve collective labor conflicts are different, the improving of the worker are related 
with better salaries, social conditions, healthy and security in the workplaces, etc., of the 
Economically Activity Population (PEA). During the period of assessing more than 206 
thousands of Peruvian workers were benefited from resolution of the labor conflicts, 
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approximately the 25% of them were increased their salaries. Furthermore, the 
enterprises were allowed to produce and sell to obtain benefits.   
 
Table Nº 7: Collective Labor Conflicts solved by the Ministry of Labor (2006 – 2009) 
 
Years Extraprocess meetings 
Number of resolved 
labor conflicts 
Benefited workers 
(Thousands) 
2006 103 13    20,76 
2007 211 57     50,10 
2008 759 123     137,11 
2009* 879 120     51,77 
Total 1.952 313     260, 
                Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 (*) January – September, 2009. 
 
 
Likewise, we must to consider that the organization of informative meetings, dialogue 
meetings and extraprocess meetings, promoted every day by the Ministry of Labor 
express the predisposition of Peruvian worker an employers in disputing to participate 
in the social dialogue, by this workers and employers can facilitate to express their 
positions, proposals, ideas, even political decisions, etc., which in turn this can be seen 
as mechanism to allow to strengthen the democratic values in Perú, this is an important 
additional benefit that most of the time is ignored.    
 
Table Nº 8: Benefits from solved collective labor conflicts in the mining sector (2006 - 
2009) (annual fluxes) 
 
Years 
Extraprocess 
meetings 
Resolved Collectv 
Labor conflicts 
Benefited mining 
workers 
(Thousand) 
Benefits 
(Mill. US$) 
2006 48 8 15,31  20,0 
2007 123 45 40,37  65,0 
2008 276 78 34,87  60,0 
2009* 526 71 29,23  62,8 
Total 973 202   207,8 
                Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 (*) January – September, 2009. 
 
Thus, we can see that since January, 2006, up to the third quarterly of present year, 
2009, the Ministry of Labor directly avoided huge economic losses especially in the 
mining sector, more than US$ 207 mills. This estimation is not considering the indirect 
benefits such as social US$ Dollars to finance some importations, the collect of taxes 
revenue to finance social projects, among others. Finally, the number of benefited 
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workers in other economic sectors after solved their labor conflicts are in table Nº 9, the 
more benefited were mining workers.    
 
Table Nº 9: Number of benefited union workers after solved collective conflicts 
Economic sectors 2006 2007 2008 Total % 
Mining and Quarrying   0 0 0 0 0.00 
Manufacturing industry 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Real estate, renting and Business activities 15.311 20.645 19.983 55.939 61.36 
Cooperative society of services 0 3.002 14.502 17.504 19.20 
Electricity, gas and water supply 645 0 0 645 0.71 
Transportations, Storage and Communications 0 0 1.115 1.115 1.22 
Financial intermediation 128 0 0 128 0.14 
Construction (building) 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Fishing 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Education 0 419 9.874 10.293 11.29 
Health and social work 0 0 0 0 0.00 
Public Administration and Security 0 2.539 2.851 5.390 5.91 
Retail and Wholesale Commerce  0 0 0 0 0.00 
Activity others 0 0 157 157 0.17 
TOTAL 16.084 26.605 48.482 91.171 100 
Source: National Direction of Working Relationships – MTPE 
 
VI.- Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Beyond any reasonable doubt, behavior of mining stakeholders are not liken other 
economic sectors related participants which in turn is likely to bring different results in 
terms of collective working relationships, furthermore other important factor as 
`industrial organization of economic policy preparation´ would definitely challenge 
them and be a misunderstanding prone issue, if overlooked. Likewise, it is fair to point 
out that Peruvian government `as time goes by´ is not used to deal with the relation 
between scientific insights and policy proposals in the institutional setup of ´economic 
policy preparation` which in turn is making to bring social frustrations and problems. 
This is exactly what happened currently in different economic sectors too. 
  
Some collective labor conflicts might become useful for some Peruvian mining workers 
to reach better labor conditions, it appears that in Perú the positive and benefit influence 
of labor conflict on wage formation is intended to foster a reasonable monitoring of the 
social dialogue, liken other countries such as The Netherlands and France. On the other 
hand, these so called collective labor conflicts can and are making worker`s unions fall 
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prey to this senseless complaining and conflicting related trend to the extent where 
unionized rights have become a double edged sword in terms of convenience. Worker 
unions are negotiated their salaries independently -without national coordination- which 
in turn is likely to bring big differences -in terms of social and economic conditions- 
between workers.   
 
To be fair and square, as technology earns more benefits day by day, we have to 
understand that the journey of true Peruvian progress is regarded with a correct 
`industrial organization of economic policy preparation´ like The Netherlands and other 
European countries. This could be relatively a new concept in Perú that the government 
should assess and consider in its institutional setup of economic policy preparations. 
 
On reflection, and spite of the dependency it might sometimes trigger the breakthrough 
of the labor conflicts themselves remain favorable for Peruvian workers whereas the 
disadvantage related discouragement/issue labor unionized can be seen as minor. 
Workers are stressing over keeping up with their status. The Ministry of Labor must 
anticipate the importance of “mining conflicts” and other important factors such as 
causes (“raising salary” and “special bonus”). Furthermore, some collective labor 
conflicts might become overwhelming and useful especially for some Peruvian mining 
workers. 
 
To be fair and square, the costs of unresolved labor conflicts mean quite losses in Perú, 
no only in lost labor hours but it is also in the future capacity productivity and general 
wealth. This in the long run make increasing workers income seem less available 
because these labor problems are in fact a gimmick/detrimental. As we speak, an 
adequate social conflict management is becoming ever more compelling, and despite 
this sense of importance that solution implies, we are constantly encouraged to fulfill 
other ways to resolve social problems in order to look socially better. These –in the long 
run- make social conflicts seem less available because social needs are in fact a 
gimmick. 
 
It is important to point out that the Ministry of Labor must consider to implement a 
special Analysis Department of Labor Conflict in order the assess collective labor 
conflicts scientifically, this special office must evaluate causes or motivations of the 
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conflicts, their treatment, evolution, to obtain conclusions to set up scientifically public 
policies to reduce them, or for giving especial training in prevention and resolution 
labor conflicts. Besides, other function should be to manage the Early Alert System. 
This Office must be integrated by engineers, economists, but not lawyers. 
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